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THE IMPACT, REGULATION AND
EFFICACY OF LAWYER ADVERTISING
By CHESTER N. MITCHELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal profession has traditionally distinguished the market for legal
services from other service markets. Avoidance of commercial advertisements
as a source of information about the market for lawyers has been an integral
part of that market's distinctiveness. Until recently every provincial law
society restricted the content, frequency, scale and form of their mem-
bers' advertisements. Canon 5(3) of the Canons of Legal Ethics of the
Canadian Bar Association advises that: "The publication of ordinary simple
business cards is not per se improper, but solicitation of business by circulars
or advertisements ... is unprofessional .. . " This Canon follows almost
verbatim the American Bar Association's formal ban on advertising formu-
lated in 1908 to which the ABA's Canon of Ethics added: "The most worthy
and effective advertisement possible ... is the establishment of a well merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust." This ban was
justified on the grounds that advertising was unnecessary.' While building a
good reputation may have been the most effective form of promotion, it need
not follow that all less effective methods should subsequently be prohibited.
Similarly, while most lawyers in 1908 probably could rely on personal con-
tacts alone, one cannot presume that these methods were even then "most
worthy and effective" for every lawyer. A willingness to refrain from com-
mercial advertising has its roots in the English class structure; a structure
that operated in the fashion of a cartel. At one time practically all aspiring
barristers at the Inns of Court were the sons of wealthy families; and this,
at a time when the upper classes denigrated "trade". Commercial com-
petition was considered crass.2
Lawyers, I shall presume, share features with other service-oriented pro-
fessionals such as accountants, financial advisors, or opthamologists. Ques-
tions pertinent to legal advertising will to some extent relate to advertising
issues in similar fields. Does advertising impede or assist market entry? Does
advertising raise or lower prices? And if lower prices result will that increase
demand for certain legal services? How effective in general has self-regulation
been? Chief Justice Burger suggested in Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar of
Arizona3 that the enforcement burdens of policing lawyer advertising stand-
© Copyright, 1982, Chester N. Mitchell.
* Mr. Mitchell is a member of the graduating class of 1980 at the University of
Western Ontario Law School.
I Andrews, Birth of a Salesman: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation (Chicago:
ABA Press, 1980) at 1.
2 Id. at 85.
3 Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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ards would be enormous. 4 Does the record from other fields support that
contention? Does the legal profession exhibit conditions conducive to fraudu-
lent promotion? What type of advertising, if any, will most effectively
sell legal services? And will effective advertising conflict with ethical considera-
tions? The object of this paper is to answer these questions in light of
the relevant research into advertising and to analyze the legal status of
restrictions on lawyer advertising in terms of recent developments in anti-
trust law in both Canada and the United States.
II. ADVERTISING AS ONE SOURCE OF INFORMATION
Before investigating the arguments for and aga;inst advertising, it is help-
ful to know the relative importance of commercial messages as compared to
other sources of market information.
Advertising is visible, commercial and organized. For these reasons a
tendency may exist to overestimate the impact of commercial promotions.
Advertising agencies themselves have an incentive to exaggerate their ability
to manipulate consumer responses.5 The editor of the Journal of Advertising
Research admits, however, that "[r]esponses to advertising, despite our
hopes, are usually weakly motivated."6 Winter concludes that the "alleged
manipulative effects of advertising are simply not established in the litera-
ture."'7 Fair maintains that an unwarranted belief in and a fear of the
persuasive powers of both propaganda and advertising has developed since
the 1940s.8 Psychologist J.A.C. Brown agrees that advertising has been over-
rated. Brown concludes that advertising is a "form of propaganda", and that
the advertiser or propagandist is "comparatively helpless" in influencing es-
tablished trends.9
The prime alternative to commercial advertising appears to be person-
to-person, word-of-mouth communication. It has been said that word-
4Id. at 2711 (S. Ct.), 387 (U.S.); also (1977), 63 A.B.A.J. 1093 at 1097. Contrast
Chief Justice Burger's fear that lawyer advertising will create "problems of un-
manageable proportions" with Bork's appraisal: "I think the damage ascribable to
advertising is slight, and I suspect that in attempting to repair it, we are likely to do
more harm in the aggregate than good." See, Bork, "Commentary," in Tuerck, ed.,
Issues in Advertising - The Economics of Persuasion (Washington: American Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1978) at 49.
5 In selling his profession, ad man Paul Stevens, for example, makes the grandiose
claim that "advertising can sell you anything." Stevens, I Can Sell You Anything (New
York: Wyden, 1972) at 2. Stevens overlooks the economic fact that disposable income
is limited and that as Brink and Kelley found, the consumer "is by no means easy to
manipulate by the 'hidden persuaders,'. . ." Brink and Kelley, The Management of
Promotion (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963) at 354.
6Ramond, Advertising Research: The State of the Art (New York: Association of
National Advertisers, 1976) at 9.
7 Winter, "Advertising and Legal Theory," in Tuerck, supra note 4, at 16.
8 Fair, The New Nonsense; the End of the National Consensus (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1974) at 236-40.
9 Brown, Techniques of Persuasion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) at 189.
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of-mouth advertising is the consumer's most important information source.10
It is apparently least vital in situations where buyers have little at stake and
are not uncertain, thus the market for low price, low risk consumables such
as soft drinks, cosmetics, beer, soap and confections represents the area least
dependent on word-of-mouth advertising. As expected, these commodities
are among the most heavily advertised products." Nelson reports that the
ratio of advertising expenditures to sales revenues for some of these products
are: beer-6.8%, over-the-counter drugs-10% and perfume-14%.' 2 By way
of contrast, industries spending an average of 2% of revenues on promotion
feature higher cost products such as motor vehicles, tires and appliances.
Businesses with the lowest relative advertising budgets include primary in-
dustries and commercial enterprises where product costs are high and where
both buyers and sellers are well informed.13
Legal services should be a low advertising business on two grounds.
First, word-of-mouth contacts are most important where a high degree of
uncertainty exists and much is at stake. The market for lawyers meets both
of these criteria. Most people have only slight knowledge about lawyers. An
American survey reported that 28% of Americans had used a lawyer only
once while 33 % had never employed a lawyer at all.14 Furthermore, when a
lawyer's services are needed the stakes are normally high. As a result, 47%
of the respondents in a Canadian Gallup Poll indicated that recommenda-
tions of family and friends were the primary means of selecting a lawyer.
Another 14.6% of the anglophone respondents said they would most likely
select a lawyer they met socially.15 The other important source of informa-
tion guiding lawyer selection was the recommendation of business associates
-again, a reliance shown upon word-of-mouth. As a consistent converse, a
majority in that Gallup survey indicated that Yellow Pages advertisements
were the source of information they would be least likely to rely upon.'1
These findings, however, do not rule out commercial advertising as a
potentially effective adjunct to personal recommendations. This is so for
three reasons. First, the present reliance on personal contacts may be due in
part to the absence of effective commercial promotions. Second, Yellow Page
messages convey very limited amounts of data concerning legal services.
Third, if advertising were permitted it might be most useful to persons who
lack experience with lawyers and whose peers lack experience with lawyers.
The second ground for legal services being a low advertising industry is
the relative importance of commercial transactions. Pashigan reports that in
10 Arndt, Word of Mouth Advertising: A Review of the Literature (New York:
Advertising Research Foundation, 1967) at 70.
"Nelson, Advertising as Information (1974), 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729 at 739.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Supra note 1, at 81.
15 Canadian Gallup Poll, "Omnibus Study," conducted by the Canadian Bar Associ-
ation, March and April, 1978.
16 Id. at Table I.
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the U.S., business firms generate the same dollar volume of business for the
legal profession as individuals do.' 7 Thus at least half of the market for
lawyers should follow the low advertising model. A poll conducted for the
American Bar Association Journal supports this hypothesis: funds spent on
advertising decrease as the number of lawyers in a firm increase and as
lawyer income increases. Funds spent also depend on the nature of the
practice.' 8 Shimp and Dyer found that "attorneys who intend to advertise
are younger, practise by themselves or with a small firm and concentrate on
the legal affairs of individuals rather than businesses or institutions."'u
The proportion of respondents in the ABA poll saying they would
"absolutely not advertise" dropped from 62% in 1978 to 49% in 1979.
Overall, by 1979 only 7% of American lawyers had advertised. However,
that figure understates future lawyer advertising. Not all state bar associa-
tions had completed their advertising regulations by the time of the study
and old habits are not instantly changed. As a guide to the future, it may be
noted that 14% of lawyers surveyed earning less than $25,000 advertised
whereas only 3% in the over $50,000 bracket did. While a growth trend is
evident, it appears that advertising-sales ratios will remain low because of the
greater effectiveness of and need for word-of-mouth advertising and because
of the large portion of legal service focused on business and institutional
affairs. In the first year after Manitoba permitted lawyer advertising, fewer
than half a dozen firms or lawyers availed themselves of their new oppor-
tunities. Only two firms, both in the real estate and mortgage field, mentioned




Advertising has been criticized for raising prices and reducing competi-
tion. Are these allegations warranted? And if so, are they applicable to the
market for lawyers?
Backman found no relationship between advertising-sales ratios and
changes in price since 1945. High advertising ratios did not correlate with
exceptional price increases.21 Telser's study, cited by Backman, indicated that
advertising did not correlate with market concentration or stability of market
share. Instead, this study suggests that freer entry and more competition
exists among firms that produce heavily advertised goods.22 The counter-
argument is that advertising encourages monopolization by establishing and
17 Pashigan, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand and
Supply of Lawyers (1977), 20 J. Law & Econ. 53 at 67.
18Advertising Still Laying an Egg, (1979) 65 A.B.A.J. 1014.
19 Andrews, supra note 1, at 83.
2o Trebilcock and Hudec, Lawyer Advertising and the Supply of Information in the
Market for Legal Services (1982), 20 U.W.O. L. Rev. [publication forthcoming].
21 Backman, Advertising and Competition (New York: New York University Press,
1967) at 36-38.
22 1d. at 61-66.
[VOL. 20, NO. I
Lawyer Advertising
then insulating brand names from competition. 23 Researchers in the field
report that heavy advertising can increase profits and impede entry by new
firms; however, these effects are achievable only in the market for non-
differentiated consumable goods or services. 24 Even where brand loyalty
does impede new entrants, brand name development can serve a positive role
as a means of saving on search costses or for economizing on decision
effort. In any case, one must distinguish between the promotion of low cost,
undifferentiated products, where advertising may bar entry, and the promo-
tion of higher cost, distinguishable goods and services.
As stated above, the most heavily advertised products are those which
exhibit the least quality differentiation. 27 Ehrenberg argues that in these mar-
kets there is "little scope for persuasive advertising. s2 8 Instead of directly
persuading, advertising in these areas is intended primarily to maintain market
share. It does this by reinforcing feelings of satisfaction for brands already
being used; a process known as fixation.29 The ability of producers to charge
what appear to be monopolistic prices thus may depend more on psychology
than on economics. Product originators may have a decided advantage over
later entrants into the market on the basis of fixation alone. This advantage
should be most pronounced with undifferentiated personal use products that
are closely associated with personal satisfactions and pleasures. Consumers
willing to pay higher prices for brand name products may be buying a placebo
effect.30 Conversely, where quality differences exist and where prices are
higher, advertising becomes important as an inexpensive source of information.
Advertising as information reduces prices because it reduces the risk of
innovation.3 1 The major source of competition, economists argue, is innova-
-23 This position was argued by the Federal Trade Commission in the case of
Realemon; see In Re Borden, Inc. (7-30-78) ATRR (891).
24 Comanor and Wilson, Advertising and Market Power (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1974) at 131-32.
25 d. at 116.
2 0 Id. at 24. Higher prices for branded goods may also be taken as a measure of
quality. Similarly, heavy advertising may be regarded as an implied warranty of quality.
This may explain, in part, why generic prescription drugs often cost 80% less than their
brand name counterparts. See Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs (Boston: Little, Brown,
1972) at 488-89; Canon, Advertising: The Economic Implications (London: Intertext
Books, 1974) at 86.
28 Supra note 11. Supra note 6, at 22.
29 Fixation commences when people return to a previous source of satisfaction.
Garan explains that as a satisfaction source is first enjoyed, "[t]he background for its
evaluation increases, the object becomes more valuable and is sought still more for
enjoyment." Garan, Against Ourselves: Discords from Improvements Under the Organic
Limitedness of Man (New York: Philosophica-Library, 1979) at 50. Clearly this
process is far more likely to occur with the use of inherently pleasant, personal use
products than with the purchase of necessities, tools, capital goods or vital services.
30 Winter rightly faults attacks on brand name promotion by consumerists who
ignore the fact that people enjoy feeling more beautiful or more healthy than they are.
In one sense, advertisements are designed to meet the demand for illusion. See Winter,
supra note 7, at 19. On advertised brands see also Nelson, supra note 11, at 732.
31 Advertising can have considerable impact when information alone is required.
Brown cites several examples of marketing successes in Britain and credits each of them
to the "informative aspect of advertising". Supra note 9, at 175.
1982]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
tion: new products, new techniques, new methods of management. In turn,
competition reduces prices. Understandably, it is vital that potential cus-
tomers be made aware of price and quality advantages. By reducing the time
and cost of attracting customers, advertising limits the risks of innovating.
On this basis, Trebilcock and Hudec suggest that the major cost of the
present advertising ban may be the retarding effect that a lack of advertising
has had on innovation and technological change in the legal profession. The
evidence indicates that this argument has some merit. The general thrust of
innovation in the production of legal services appears to involve inventive
management, the use of paralegals, word processing equipment, pre-printed
forms, computers and new methods of handling customer relations. As in
other fields, many of these changes are capital intensive. Their successful
implementation depends in part on attracting a large number of clients. Ad-
vertising then is important here for two reasons: to inform people of new
price and service advantages and to build the high volume of business re-
quired to make the capital outlay feasible.
This supposition conforms with reports concerning optometrists.3 2 In
states prohibiting the advertising of eye glasses and related services, eye glass
prices were 25% to 100% higher than in states without such restrictions.
The larger firms offered lower prices. Furthermore, these firms employed
fewer optometrists per unit of sales. Legal clinics similarly lower prices in
part by supplanting high cost lawyers with lower cost paralegals.
A study in California found that optometrists who did not advertise
charged an average of forty dollars an examination while those who did
advertise charged an average of twenty-seven dollars.38 And a study of
restraints on the advertising of prescription drugs produced estimates that
the higher prices caused by these restraints totalled $400 million in the
U.S. for 1975. 4 American lawyers themselves report that fee competition
since 1977 has forced them to lower their prices in some areas.35
If advertising encourages the development of larger, commercialized
firms will it not lead to monopolistic concentration? The largest four firms in
Ontario now control only 5% of the total monetary value of legal business.
Legal services, especially those for the household, are mostly local in nature.
Local advertising is less expensive than the type of national advertising
needed to create country-wide brand names. Furthermore, by their nature,
service industries do not lend themselves to the degree of concentration
present in the markets for sugar, steel, aluminum and the like. Large volume
legal clinics expanded in number from eight to seven hundred between 1974
and 1980 in the U.S. but at the same time there are 400,000 attorneys in
32Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses (1972), 15 J.
Law & Econ. 340 at 340-45; Benham and Benham, Regulating Through the Professions:
A Perspective on Information Control (1975), 18 J. Law & Eco. 421.
33 Andrews, supra note 1, at 79-80.
34 Cady, Drugs on the Market (Lexington: Heath, 1975). See also Cady, Restricted
Advertising and Competition: The Case of Retail Drugs (Washington: American Enter-
prise Institute, 1976).
35 Andrews, supra note 1, at 80.
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America. Therefore, while advertising may encourage some firm expansion in
order to exploit economics of scale, the resultant concentration will not lead
to monopolistic or even oligopolistic markets. Nation-wide marketing or-
ganizations such as those featured in the market for real estate services may
be possible, although not desirable, but even these organizations do little to
effect the autonomy of the local broker.
Finally, it may be noted that advertising can create goodwill for an ad-
vertiser. Like any capital asset, goodwill can strengthen a firm's competitive
position and thus can act as a barrier to market entry. However, superior
products, competent managers and any other factors generating satisfied cus-
tomers act as barriers to new entrants. Barring those who cannot meet certain
standards of service is a function that competition should serve.
B. Advertising's Effect on the Quality of Legal Services
Critics suggest that advertising will undermine the legal profession's
sense of dignity and encourage a decline in the quality of service. Admittedly,
some advertising is undignified and arguments have been made that mass
marketing techniques promote short term considerations.36 However, the
market for lawyers is in most ways the antithesis of the market for low cost,
mass produced consumption items or personal care products where undigni-
fied advertising may be the norm. Perhaps the most misleading advertise-
ments have traditionally been those concerned with allegedly medicinal con-
coctions. The reason for this may be the post hoc fallacy. Since most disease
is cured spontaneously it does not matter if the treatment supplied is totally
irrelevant, positive results usually follow. 37 One may safely argue that legal
problems do not have the same tendency to alleviate themselves with time.
Suitable analogies for lawyer advertising are found not in the sale
of cosmetics and drugs but in the promotion of tax, banking, brokerage
and accounting services. Since 1918, American banking services have been
advertised. The dignity and the reputation of bankers does not appear to
have suffered. Indeed, since surveys indicate that lawyers presently enjoy low
public esteem, advertising may be able to improve their public relations.
38
Lack of familiarity with lawyers seems to breed contempt. For both lawyers
and accountants, studies suggest that a majority of people do not know or
understand what these professionals do.39 Persons who have employed a law-
yer rate lawyers higher than those who have not employed one.40 Trebilcock
finds that people with previous experience with lawyers "have a higher
regard for lawyers as general problem solvers and as a resource to help pre-
3 6 Brown gives the example of planned obsolescence, supra note 9, at 178. But the
advertising emphasis on style, temporary relief, fashion, immediate gratification and
other short term interests may be dictated by the type of product and the type of
industry which benefits most from mass promotion. See Comanor and Wilson, supra
note 24.
37 Young, American Self-Dosage Medicine, (1974) at 4.
-38See, e.g., studies conducted in Maryland and Kansas in 1979, cited in Andrews,
supra note 1, at 77.
39 Andrews, supra note 1, at 19.
40 Supra note 38.
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vent future problems. ' 41 Advertising can thus assist by informing the public
of what lawyers do and when one is required. Advertising may also increase
the volume of legal business, particularly among first time users. Greater
public contact with lawyers will predictably increase public regard for the
profession.
Can the volume of legal services delivered be increased by advertising?
Campaigns by H&R Block and other tax services appear to have encouraged
a large number of middle class, first time users to try tax preparers; and
people obtain eye glasses with "greater frequency in the states with less pro-
fessional control."' ' The amount of "new business" that is actually generated
by advertisements is unclear, however there are reasons to expect that ad-
vertising will spark greater demand for lawyers. 43 Trebilcock and Hudek iden-
tify individuals and small businesses in urban settings as the main group
facing significant information problems in assessing their legal needs. Mass
media advertising should be most effective in the more densely populated
markets and with respect to routine, frequently required services. Arguably,
the legal needs involved will be those most susceptible to low cost, high
volume production methods. Legal consumers most in need of standardized
services are also those most likely to respond to commercial messages.
Will advertising cause a decline in legal service quality? Quality in law
is not easily defined. Lawyers have not compiled or developed comprehensive
criteria for qualitative assessments. Turning to other service industries, Benham
found no differences between the lower and the higher priced optometrists.
44
Cady reports that pharmacists in states permitting advertising provided supe-
rior services than those in prohibiting states.45 The legal clinics operated by
heavy advertisers, Jacoby & Meyers, were compared to more traditional firms
in the same area. The clinics were found to be more prompt, better at ex-
plaining matters and keeping clients informed, and more reasonable in their
fees.46 It should be noted, however, that this comparison lacked a proper
cross-reference group. Nonetheless, the criteria of "quality" cited are also
featured in the Canadian Gallup Poll, "Omnibus Study," conducted for the
41 Trebilcock and Hudec, supra note 2.
42 Benham and Benham, supra note 32, at 441.
4 3 American lawyers Ken Hur and Greg Home claim that their ads are attracting
people who had never talked to a lawyer before and did not know how to find one.
See Andrews, supra note 1, at 78. The relevant question, however, is whether these new
clients would have failed to seek legal service but for the advertising campaigns.
44 Benham, supra note 32, at 347-48.
45 Cady, supra note 34.
46 Andrews, supra note 1, at 81. Linenberger and Murdock tend to confirm these
results. In their comparison of attorney and consumer attitudes regarding advertising
they found that consumers felt fees were unreasonably high and current information
sources were inadequate. The lawyers surveyed tended to the opposite opinion.
Many attorneys suggested that lawyers who advertise are not as good as those who do
not advertise but consumers do not make the same presumption. Consumers were
confident that they could evaluate legal services and that they would not pick a lawyer
merely on the basis of price. See Linenberger and Murdock, Legal Service Advertising:
Wyoming Attorney Attitudes Compared with Wyoming Consumer Attitudes (1982), 17
Land & Water L. Rev. 209 at 239-40.
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Canadian Bar Association, in March and April, 1978. Responding to the
question what characteristics they desired in a lawyer, 50% said a person
who will explain the details of the case, 40% said a person who will answer
my questions and 23 % said they wanted a lawyer who was warm and friend-
ly. Only 5.3% said someone who knows the law and nothing more.
Advertising would be unprofitable if poor quality legal work dissuaded
customers from returning. Many people, however, are one-time users and
even when repeat business occurs, an average of seven years passes between
visits to the lawyer. On the other hand, lawyers may not be able to identify
those customers who will not be a source of repeat business. Nor do the
one-time customers keep their judgments to themselves. According to Arndt,
mass media are important at the awareness stage but "word-of-mouth is the
most frequently used source at the evaluation stage."47 While by no means
the sole basis for judging lawyer performance, customers are apparently able
to ascertain whether a lawyer is prompt, courteous, willing to explain in some
detail and willing to answer questions. It is also possible that these indicia
of good management skills will correlate with legal skills as well.
Advertising may also aid in maintaining quality service by permitting
brand names to be established. A comparable situation exists when customers
choose between one-of-a-kind restaurants and brand name franchises. While
quality differences exist in both classes, it is easier to know what to expect
with the brand names. Similarly, reputable department stores could, if per-
mitted, develop legal services outlets just as they have done with insurance
and travel services. Customers normally expect satisfactory quality from such
retailers because products are pre-screened and guaranteed, and because the
company depends upon repeat business. Economists agree that brand names
are important sources of quality information in markets for expensive, dif-
ferentiated goods or services. In the case of legal services, "brand names"
should increase customer certainty and thereby encourage greater utilization
of lawyers. As previously mentioned, advertising may lead to a greater degree
of market concentration with the rise of large, consumer "legal supermar-
kets". Rather than reduce competition, however, it is more plausible to expect
that the concentration likely to occur will increase competition in certain
legal sectors. Larger, capital intensive firms will be able to deliver common
and relatively standardized services to the household sector at new, lower
rates which will put pressure on small, traditional firms and sole practitioners.
The growth of larger firms, however, which by itself would increase concen-
tration, may be countered by advertising's ability to increase total demand
for legal services.
C. Enforcement of Advertising Standards
The accuracy and reliability of information is always an issue. There are
good reasons though for concluding that misleading lawyer advertising will
not be a significant problem. First, as Winter argues, fraud in general consti-
tutes a "tiny fraction of commercial transactions". The FTC prosecutes a few
hundred deceptive practices cases a year and almost half of those involve
47 Arndt, supra note 1, at 71.
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textile and fur mislabelling. 48 Bork suggests that trying to correct the damage
attributable to misleading advertising may often cause more harm than
good.
49
Certain forces deter all sellers from making false claims: the knowledge
of the customer, the cost of a bad reputation, competition and legal remedies.
Lawyers dealing with business clients normally face sophisticated consumers
of legal assistance. This is much less true with customers in the household
sector. If there are to be problems of deception they will most likely occur
there.
Posner has identified the two kinds of sellers most likely to practice
fraud: 50 sellers of innocuous or inherently uncertain goods and sellers
who are transient with no stable customer group, no fixed business locale,
no specialized resources and no visibility. Lawyers do not fit either criteria.
Their service is not "innocuous" and, far from being transient, law-
yers are among the more rooted of the community. In addition, lawyers are
highly visible and they possess specialized skills. Finally, legal remedies re-
lated to false advertising or misrepresentation should be well known to law-
yers and thus deter them more than other sellers. Since legal services are
usually a major expense it may also be presumed that customers will have
financial incentives to act upon perceived wrongs perpetrated by lawyer
advertising.
Besides these economic and legal limits on deceptive advertising, varying
types of self-regulation are practiced. The U.S. Department of Commerce
once suggested that fear of government restraints was one of the least impor-
tant and least powerful motivations for business self-control in advertising.
Dozens of industries and trade groups maintain their own advertising stand-
ards. 51 Limits are also applied by media owners. Good Housekeeping maga-
zine tests the products advertised in its pages. 52 Along similar lines, The New
Yorker is notorious for its advertising policy. The magazine refuses all self-
medication ads plus any other promotions found unsuitable, such as those
for cut-rate jewellers or second rate hotels. One would guess that "cut-rate"
lawyers would also be suspect.53
Wherever advertising bans have been lifted, bar associations and law
societies have instituted regulatory rules. These rules, and in many cases the
48 Winter, supra note 7, at 31.
49 Bork, supra note 4, at 49.
5OPosner, Regulation of Advertising by the F.T.C. (Washingtons Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1973) at 5-9.
51 Advertising Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Commerce, Self-Regulation
in Advertising, (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964).
52 See Brink and Kelley, supra note 5, at 365-71.
53 Self-imposed media restrictions follow a long tradition. The Times of London,
in 1850, regularly provided refunds if advertised products were in any way mis-
represented. In contrast, some journals refused to accept such responsibility. They
argued that sufficient protection for buyers was provided by the law. These publications,
such as News of the World, became well known for the deceptive nature of the
advertisements featured on their pages. See Nevett, Honest and decent: the early days of
voluntary control (1980), 66 Advertising 30 at 31.
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law as well, proscribe false and deceptive advertising. Are sales puffs in-
cluded as being deceptive? Prosser describes "puffing" as an "expression of
the seller's opinion only."'54 According to legal analysis, at common law when
the seller praises in general terms, buyers are not entitled to rely literally
upon the words used.es
While probably not deceptive in any important sense, puffery does de-
mean the consumer.56 Furthermore, flattering but essentially empty claims by
competitors may tend to cancel one another. On these grounds puffery should
be completely avoided in lawyer advertising. This can be accomplished by
prohibiting puffery names, like Wonder Bread, "weasel words" and non-
comparative comparisons like "You expect more from Standard, and you get
it." In other words, legal advertising should be free of opinion. Wisconsin
trial lawyer Ken Hur sponsors a demolition derby car which carries the mes-
sage: "Sideswiped? Call Ken Hur". The message and the medium are unusual
but do not involve puffery. By comparison, one Chicago firm ran an ad with
the headline: "The attorneys at Thomas H. Stern, P.C., practice aggressive
marital law."'57 The word "aggressive" here is unacceptable. It is vague and
opinionated.
Some contend that legal services cannot be standardized. If that argu-
ment is correct then advertised fees for "standard" or "routine" work are by
their nature misleading. Certain legal work is very personalized or specific.
Such work will not be advertised. On the other hand, the provision of any
services will of necessity entail some degree of variation. Such variations do
not preclude legal societies from establishing standard or minimum fees for
legal work.
Deceptive lawyer advertising will be deterred by business self-interest,
by legal sanctions and by self-regulation. The Law Society of Manitoba has
formulated an excellent model of advertising regulation. A wide scope for
advertising is permitted; for instance members may advertise both price and
non-price information in any medium but the content of the advertisements
is rigidly controlled. Non-price advertising must be incapable of misleading
the public. It must also be dignified and free of claims of superiority. Price
advertising must accurately describe the services provided, avoid words such
as "from", "minimum" or "and up", and state whether disbursements are
included. All firm members undertaking the advertised service must adhere
to the fees quoted.
54 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. Minnesota: West 1971) at
722-23. As an example of what puffing entails, the Chicago Tribune bars advertisers
from employing superlatives such as "lowest prices" but the Tribune itself is billed as
"the world's greatest newspaper". See Preston, The Great American Blow-Up-Puffery
in Advertising and Selling (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975) at 4, 20.
65 Prosser, supra note 54.
56 While puffery may not be deceptive (depending upon whether our standard is
the reasonable man or the credulous man), it is arguably effective in selling certain
types of products. See Preston, supra note 54 at 28 and Baker, The Permissible Lie:
the inside truth about advertising (Cleveland: World Pub., 1968) at 14-25.
57 Andrews, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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D. Impact of Advertising on the Legal Profession
Service industry advertising appears to encourage higher volume, lower
profit-margin forms of business. Large pharmacies, for example, enjoy a
greater market share in states permitting pharmacies to advertise. 8 As noted
previously, established optometrists are likely to benefit if advertising is pro-
hibited. 9 The dominant theme of the optometrists' Code of Ethics, in
Benham's opinion, is thus the elimination of information sources that
would most aid large-volume, commercial firms.60
Extending the above findings to lawyers, general practitioners in small
firms may well lose business to lower cost "commercial" firms. These opera-
tions may be in a position to practise what economists call "cream skim-
ming." This occurs when a competitor gains control of the most profitable
tasks leaving the tougher, less lucrative undertakings to weaker competitors.
The effect is speculative. What is clear is that higher volume operations in
the U.S. do lower prices on a certain range of legal services.
The impact of low price firms on the legal profession will depend upon
what segment of the profession is being examined. Lawyers engaged in busi-
ness and institutional work will hardly be affected. Likewise, lawyers in small
towns and rural areas where economies of scale are not available will also
not be significantly affected by the change. Two groups may benefit. First,
those with the entrepreneurial skill to run a successful high volume legal
business may have much to gain in terms of greater income. Second, an in-
creasing number of new lawyers should also welcome advertising and the
marketing changes it brings about. Inexperienced entrants naturally charge
lower fees. If advertising can increase clients' awareness of price disparities,
it may help reduce the time required to develop a viable practice. Advertising
may also encourage clients to consider other lawyers, at least for some work;
a change that will de-emphasize the traditional loyalties which hinder new
entrants. Finally, there is the important possibility that advertising will in-
crease the demand for legal services by attracting clients who would other-
wise not hire a lawyer. Frierson found that middle-class Americans consistently
overestimated lawyer's fees-91% over for a will, 340% over for advice on
a two-page installment sales contract, 123% over for a thirty minute con-
sultation. In addition, 75% had no will and 75% had not seen a lawyer on
any personal matter within five years.6' The American Bar Association's
study, The Legal Needs of the Public62 also detailed the public's problems of
knowing how to find a lawyer, what a lawyer might cost and even when they
required legal assistance. As examples, 60% of American homebuyers did not
58 See Cady, supra note 34.
59 See Benham, supra note 32, at 351.
60 Whitman also argues that advertising engenders price competition and results in
lower professional profits though the relationship between prices and profits is probably
more complex than Whitman allows. See Whitman, Advertising by Professionals (1978),
16 American Bus. L.J. 39.
61 Freedman, "Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: Legal Ethics, Commercial
Speech and Free Speech," in Hyman, ed., Advertising and Free Speech, (1976) at 66-79.
62 Curran and Spalding, The Legal Needs of the Public: the Final Report of a
National Survey (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1977).
[V€OL. 20, NO. 1
Lawyer Advertising
use a lawyer and only 27% of adults have up-to-date wills. There would
appear to be a sizeable latent demand for lawyers. If advertising could stimu-
late that demand, then freer marketing regulations and lower prices should
increase the demand for legal services. If the number of lawyers in practice
remained constant while demand increased, prices would also increase, per-
haps enough to offset the benefits of innovative operations. However, the
membership in the profession is increasing. Economists predict that this alone
would push prices down, especially in those areas where inexperienced law-
yers can most easily enter the market.6
Lawyers most unlikely to benefit from advertising are those who are
already established in smaller, general urban practices. Two factors, however,
mitigate the danger of price competition for the established practitioner.
First, many legal services are not routine. Where the use of computers, forms
and paralegals cannot reduce costs the high volume firm may have no ad-
vantage. Second, many criteria other than price are considered in choosing
or retaining a lawyer. Factors such as competence, special expertise, honesty
and reputation may matter more than price; a significant proportion of clients
employ the same lawyer again. A majority of clients (63%) indicated in the
Gallup Poll that they never discussed fees with their lawyer. Only 11%
changed lawyers because of price or dissatisfaction. A study in Oregon
(1978) found that the single most important factor in lawyer selection was
the extent to which one is able to use the lawyer for all of one's needs.6
Apparently, a long term relationship with a general practitioner is still highly
valued.
If advertising does cause a net increase in demand for lawyers, an addi-
tional concern is raised. If more people hire more lawyers will there not be
unwarranted strain on parts of the legal system-specifically the court sys-
tem? While a larger volume of litigation because of advertising is possible,
more litigation is not necessarily a negative result. And if genuine problems
do occur they should be solved not by restricting access to lawyers but by
changing court procedures or the law itself.
IV. ADVERTISING CONTENT AND MEDIA CHOICE
The Professional Organization Committee's report for the Ontario Gov-
ernment65 recommended that the Law Society of Upper Canada should
submit to the Attorney General a revised Rules of Professional Conduct
permitting lawyers to advertise. These advertisements could provide both
price and non-price information but only in print media. The Committee also
suggested that in the absence of action by the L.S.U.C. the Ontario Govern-
ment should move to amend the Law Society Act.66 As can be seen, the
primary difference between Ontario's proposed restrictions on advertising and
Manitoba's actual regulations is the provision concerning electronic media.
,63 "Job-market trials of young lawyers," Macleans, Apr. 6, 1981 at 50.
64 Andrews, supra note 1, at 83.
15 Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, The Report of the Professional
Organizations Committee (Toronto: The Ministry of the Attorney General, 1980).
06 R.S.O. 1980, c. 233.
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Permissible in Manitoba, lawyer advertising on radio or television would be
banned in Ontario. Is this restriction reasonable? Why are television and
radio less acceptable than print media? What lessons can be learned in this
area from the advertising business?
Of the 7% of American lawyers advertising in 1979, 33% used the
Yellow Pages, 31% the newspapers, 7% magazines, 7% leaflets, 2% direct
mail and 2% radio. Very few used television. 67 By comparison, Benham
found that some optometrists spent 80% of their advertising budget on local
television. 8 Local television has also been used to good effect by Jacoby &
Meyers, Cawley & Schmidt and Group Legal Services. State Bar Associations
in Ohio, Oklahoma, Missouri and Connecticut have experimented with tele-
vision campaigns.69 In support of television, it has been argued that the
broadcast media are the most effective and persuasive channels of mass com-
munications.70 A study by the Illinois State Bar Association in 1977 meas-
ured the response to three weeks of advertisements in television, radio and
newspapers. Reportedly, 71% of the respondents remembered the television
ads while only 39% recalled reading the same ad in newspapers. 71 If tele-
vision is an effective medium for advertising is Ontario's proposed limit on
that medium simply another attempt to limit competition?
The arguments are notably weak. The above Illinois study commits the
cardinal sin of advertising research-it measures communication by itself.7
2
According to Ramond, research must tabulate both what an advertisement
communicates and what it sells. Advertising research has repeatedly found
that successful communication may not sell anything. Similarly, advertise-
ments can sell without apparently having communicated. 78
Critics claim that television is inherently more deceptive than other
media; that it emphasizes style over substance and manipulates subliminally.
Others suggest the manipulative capacities of television have been exag-
gerated. Zielske found that television commercials were quickly forgotten.
74
Current campaigns in more than a dozen nations to restrict tobacco and
alcohol consumption by banning television commercials for these drugs have
met with little success.75 To repeat a point made earlier, however, other pro-
67 Supra note 18. The lawpoll reports that as yet no individual lawyer or firm
has utilized or intends to utilize television, however, Wisconsin lawyer Ken Hur proves
an exception to this finding. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 12.
68 Benham, supra note 32, at 349.
69 Andrews, supra note 1, at 19, 23.
70 Currie, Attorney Advertising Over the Broadcast Media (1979), 32 Van. L. Rev.
755 at 765.
71 Id.
72 See Ramond, supra note 6, at 3-4.
78 Id.
74 Id. at 53-55.
75 See generally, Berger and Wiseman, Report on Anti-Smoking Legislation (Non-
Medical Use of Drugs Directorate, 1976); Ogborne and Smart, Will Restrictions on
Alcohol Advertising Reduce Alcohol Consumption? (1980), 75 Br. J. of Addiction 293;
and Bourgeois and Barnes, Does Advertising Increase Alcohol Consumption (1978),
J. of Ad. Research.
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fessionals have had success with television. E.F. Hutton's business tripled be-
tween 1970 and 1977. A six-week television campaign for Cawley & Schmidt
allegedly brought in one new client for every ten dollars spent on advertise-
ing. At the least, Ontario's prohibition against proposed lawyer advertising on
radio and television is probably not necessary.
If all media were available, what type of ad in what context will work
best? The institutional advertisements funded by legal societies are directed
toward three objectives: image building, promotion and provision of legal
services in general. Efforts to build the image of the profession as a whole
are a questionable use of resources. 76 This is understandable in light of what
advertisers recommend. Successful campaigns are personal, they focus on one
objective and ask the potential customer to do something specific. Ads
promoting half-hour consultations with a lawyer for fifteen dollars or ads say-
ing something specific about wills are more powerful than campaigns merely
encouraging people to consult their family lawyer. Institutional advertise-
ments can also err by explaining how society benefits from the profession.
While flattering to the profession or the industry, these ads do not stimulate
demand for legal services as do ads explaining how the individual can specifi-
cally benefit. Ads that use fear tactics and that are argumentative are also
weak. Institutional ads can be useful, however, in providing information
about lawyer referral services or in letting people know where explanatory
brochures can be acquired.
77
Advertising responses in general should be measured, not assumed. A
survey of lawyers who advertised in the first attorney advertising section of
the Los Angeles Times revealed that 42% of the respondents received no calls
as a result of their ads and that 81% found no one came in for a free consul-
tation. 78 However, most of those initial ads were simply published business
cards providing little information. Studies in Ohio and Maryland indicate
that legal clients favour ads providing a generous amount of information.7"
People are exposed to thousands of advertisements each day. They are
understandably selective about what they notice.80 The prime consideration
7 0Image building or influencing public opinion is a "complex and uncertain"
matter as Pierson stresses. Because the assessment of image building campaigns is so
uncertain, there exists the danger of badly miscalculating the amount of promotion
required. See Pierson, "Sales-Related and Institutional Advertising: The Case of Rate-
regulated Public Utilities in Tuerck, ed., The Political Economy of Advertising
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978) 207.
77 Andrews, supra note 1, at 22-25.
78 Id. at 16.
79 Id. at 30. Advertising executive David Ogilvy advises that if one is advertising
chewing gum, there is not much to say so keep the copy short. But if the product has
many different qualities to recommend it then one should write long copy. In respect
to this last type of product, Ogilvy concludes that "the more you tell, the more you
sell". Ogilvy used 719 words of copy in an advertisement for Rolls-Royce and 960
words in an ad promoting industrial development in Puerto Rico. Ogilvy, Confessions
of An Advertising Man (New York: Dell, 1963) ch. 5.
8oFirestone, for example, lists eight "self-defence mechanisms" consumers possess
that mitigate against the blandishments of commercial advertisers. See Firestone, The
Economic Implications of Advertising (Toronto: Methuen, 1967) at 181.
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for lawyers competing in the attention market would appear to be effective
research. 8' One must identify the correct target group, utilize the most effec-
tive medium and ensure that the message's content is noticed, remembered
and acted upon. It would seem, for instance, that certain radio stations are
the best means for reaching persons recently arrested,82 that television
addresses the largest number of "middle class" and that classified newspaper
advertisements are not effective in promoting legal services. Naturally, one
must also be prepared to cope with the volume of business a successful
campaign generates.
V. LEGAL ADVERTISING AND ANTI-TRUST LAW
According to the empirical evidence, prohibiting advertising increases
a profession's profits by permitting members to charge above competitive
prices.83 As the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the U.K. recently
reported, 84 traditional restrictions on lawyer advertising are not in the public
interest. The issue to be addressed in this section is whether the public in-
terest can be protected by anti-trust laws. Are restrictions on lawyer adver-
tising in any way illegal in Canada under section 32 of the Combines Investi-
gation Act?85 The Act was amended in 1976 to include the professions. 80 In
1978, the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation
Act, decided that the Law Society of British Columbia and the Benchers of
the Society had committed an offence under section 32 by finding lawyer
Donald Jabour guilty of unbecoming conduct because of his advertising activi-
ties. The issue whether section 32 could apply to the Law Society went to
trial.87 At trial Mr. Justice MacKoff of the Supreme Court of British Colum-
bia found that section 32 did apply, and that no conflict existed between the
Act and the provincial statute, the Legal Professions Act.88 According to
MacKoff J., the object of the Legal Professions Act was to control the quality
of the legal profession, whereas the object of the Combines Investigation Act
was to suppress undue restraints on competition.89 Section 48 (b) of the Legal
Professions Act prohibited "conduct unbecoming a member of the Society."
81 See generally, Mallickson and Nason, Advertising - How to Write the Kind That
Works, (New York: Scribners, 1977) ch. 2.
82 Andrews, supra note 1, at 35.
8 3 Restrictions on advertising by professionals contribute, on average, 10.8% to the
earnings of professional practitioners in a sample of Canadian professions. Muzondo
and Pazderka, Professional Licensing and Competition Policy: Effects of Licensing and
Competition Policy: Effects of licensing on earnings and rate-of-return differentials
(Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Research Monograph No. 5) at 127.
84 England, Royal Commision on Legal Services, Final Report (1979) at 371.
85 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as am. (1974-1975-1976, c. 76).
86S.C. 1974-1975-1976, c. 76, s. 14(3).
87 Jabour v. Law Soc. of B.C., Law Soc. of B.C. v. A.G. of Can. (1979), 98
D.L.R. (3d) 442, 45 C.P.R. (2d) 163 (B.C.S.C.).
88R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 214, s. 48(b)(iii) (now the Barristers and Solicitors Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 26).
89 Supra note 87, at 456 (D.L.R.), 177-78 (C.P.R.). Discussed generally at 452-56
(D.L.R.), 173-78 (C.P.R.).
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But advertising, per se, was held not to be "unbecoming behaviour"." MacKoff
J. left the Benchers authority to find some advertising "unbecoming"; indeed,
he stated that the Law Society had a duty to establish and enforce advertising
standards.91 There was, however, "no specific nor implicit authorization in
the Legal Professions Act" by which the Law Society could impose a "blan-
ket restraint tantamount to a complete prohibition of advertising. ' 92 Due to
this lack of specific authority, section 32 did apply to the defendants.
Whether or not section 32 was contravened was not argued.
On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided that the Law
Society could prohibit commercial advertising by its members.93 Since the
court cited, "without apology", the related American cases of Bates,94 and
Parker v. Brown95 and relied in part upon these cases for support in the
rejection of the anti-trust argument, an analysis of the cases is warranted.
Parker v. Brown established that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act" did not
apply to state government actions. The object of the Act, it was reasoned,
was to prevent damage caused by private sector monopolies. But monopolies
created by state governments should be presumed to be in the public interest.
The Parker doctrine is based on considerations of federalism and judicial
restraint. Regardless of their wisdom, state economic regulations are exempt
from anti-trust laws.97 In Parker v. Brown, the State of California created a
marketing board to fix agricultural prices. Implementation of controls was
determined by referenda among radish growers. In effect, the Parker scheme
amounted to a state-sanctioned agricultural cartel.
Price fixing was also featured in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.98 A
schedule of fees for title searches established by the Virginia Bar was judged
to be in violation of the Sherman Act. The Bar in Goldfarb acted as a private
organization, not a "state agency"; therefore, the "state action exemption?'
from Parker did not apply. The prerequisites of the exemption by the time
of Bates were threefold: 99
1. state regulations must authorize the anticompetitive activity;
2. the state regulations must directly order and compel the activity;
9ld. at 462 (D.L.R.), 183 (C.P.R.).
91 Id. at 463 (D.L.R.), 184 (C.P.R.).
9 2 Id.
9 3 Jabour v. Law Soc. of B.C.; Law Soc. of B.C. v. A.G. of Can. (1981), 115 D.L.R.
(3d) 549 at 561, [1981] 2 W.W.R. 159 at 175, 53 C.P.R. (2d) 87 at 100 (B.C.C.A.). Aff'd
S.C.C., Aug. 9, 1982, not yet reported. See Strauss, "Restrictions on lawyer's ads upheld by
the Supreme Court," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Aug. 10, 1982 at 1, col. 1.
9 4 Supra note 3.
95 317 U.S. 341, 87 L. Ed. 315, 63 S. Ct. 307 (1943).
96 15 U.S.C. s. 1-6 (1976).
9 7 Page, Antitrust, Federalism and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and
Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum (1981), 61 Boston
U. L.R. 1099 at 1100.
98421 U.S. 773, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1975).
9 9 Student Project, Attorney Advertising: Bates Impact on Regulation (1978), 29
S. Carolina L.R. 457 at 494.
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3. the anticompetitive activity must relate to the primary purpose of the
state regulations.
These three conditions were met in Bates. Bates and O'Steen conceded that
their advertisements violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B). This rule was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Arizona as Rule 29(a). In addition, Rule
29(a) specifically prohibited lawyers from advertising in newspapers, maga-
zines, or telephone directories and on radio and television, and so on. These
restrictions also related directly, so it was reasoned, to the regulation of the
legal profession by the state. Seaton J.A. for the British Columbia Court of
Appeal approved of this part of Bates, saying: "I think.., that that is the
proper approach to the relationship between provincial or state regulatory
authorities and federal anti-combines legislation."' 100 One of the three con-
ditions necessary to preclude anti-trust law was not, however, satisfied in
Jabour. The provincial statute did not "directly order and compel the anti-
competitive activity."' 0'1 There was no reference to advertising in the Legal
Professions Act. The Benchers' rulings which did mention and affect adver-
tising were not rules made pursuant to a statute.10 2 If the court is to suspend
inquiry into anticompetitive activities out of respect for provincial autonomy
then arguably, it should be evident that the activity has been clearly author-
ized by provincial legislation. Without authorization the activities would be
criminal offenses, therefore the authorization should be express, not implied.
In Bates the authorization was perfectly clear; in Jabour it was not.
Two other difficulties confront the Court of Appeal in its finding support
in Bates. First, because it was open to the Bates Court to find the Arizona
prohibition unconstitutional on First Amendment, freedom of speech grounds,
a close scrutiny of the Parker doctrine was not required. The third condition
of the state action exemption, for example, appears to leave room for a
variety of interpretations. Since Goldfarb, the Supreme Court has shown
renewed interest in Parker.03 Most recently in Midcal Aluminum, 10 4 the
Court narrowed the Parker exception to those anticompetitive policies "ac-
tively supervised" by state agencies. While this distinction between supervised
and unsupervised authorization may prove to be unworkable, it is clear that
on facts similar to Parker the Court is now saying the Sherman Act applies.
Second, the United States Justice Department reportedly intends to
pursue further anti-trust actions to clarify those circumstances in which the
organized bar functions as a private group making agreements subject to
anti-trust violations, as in Goldfarb, or as a state agency, as in Bates. Thus,
in the United States, the state action exemption doctrine, which Jabour did
not satisfy as it stood in 1977, is being narrowed further.
'OOSupra note 93, at 572 (D.L.R.), 188 (W.W.R.), 110 (C.P.R.).
1o Supra note 87, at 463 (D.L.R.), 184 (C.P.R.).
1O2 Supra note 87, at 461 (D.L.R.), 182 (C.P.R.).
03oSupra note 97, at 1101.
104 California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminium, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100
S.C. 937 (1980).
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It should be noted that despite the Bates decision, which forced state
codes to lift the total ban on advertising, major limitations still face many
American lawyers wishing to advertise.'1 5 In Hellman's opinion some of the
proposed responses to Bates "seem designed more to thwart advertising by
lawyers than to permit it."'" States limit content by, for example, forbidding
hourly rates to be advertised; Georgia attorneys cannot use color, graphics
or type larger than one half centimeter and direct mail advertising is pro-
hibited in thirty-eight states. 107
These developments suggest that even if a ban on commercial advertis-
ing is found to be subject to and in contravention of s. 32 of the Combines
Investigation Act, less stringent but still anticompetitive rules could be sub-
stituted. Such stop gap measures, however, may be short lived if the Ameri-
can Supreme Court example set in In Re R.M.J. is followed. 08 In that case
the Court clearly felt free to ask whether the advertising restraint in question
was in the public interest. 0 9 Since most advertising restraints imposed by
the organized bar are not in the public interest, a combination of federal
pressure, adverse publicity and continuing anti-trust challenges will likely
encourage Canadian law societies to reform their advertising codes.*
VII. CONCLUSION
Lawyer advertising will probably be of significance only in the market
for personal legal services in large towns and cities. In that market, advertis-
ing will encourage innovative methods of supplying legal services. Adver-
tising will assist new entrants and increase competitive pressures. Lower
prices for certain types of services will result. Improved access due to client
information and lower prices will increase the demand for lawyers in the
effected market. Lawyers' services, despite a more liberalized approach to
promotion, will remain in the low advertising-to-sales ratio category. Elabo-
rate and rigid regulatory schemes to supervise lawyer advertising are prob-
ably not required because a number of factors will limit deceptive lawyer
advertising."-0 If it is true that potential clients generally want and respond
most favorably to factual, informative advertisements devoid of hype and
puffery then good ethics will be synonymous with good business. Finally,
competently conducted research and experimentation is needed to ascertain
what type of advertisement will best suit the needs and objectives of lawyers.
105 Andrews, "The Selling of a Precedent" (1982), 10 Student Lawyer 12 at 14.
10 Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on Lawyer Advertising:
Some Practical, Legal and Policy Questions (1978), 31 Ok. L.R. 509 at 509.
1o7 Supra note 105, at 47-48.
10 8 In Re R.M.J., 50 LW. 4185 at 4189 (S. Ct. 1982).
109 Supra note 105, at 47.
1 0 See notes 5,9 and 80, supra.
*The efficacy of such challenges now appears tenuous given the Supreme Court of
Canada's recent ruling in the Jabour case, rendered after the writing of this article.
Supra note 93.
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